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The Constitutional Dimensions of
Aboriginal Title
Brian Slattery*

I. INTRODUCTION
In attempting to explain the nature of Aboriginal title, commentators
have often resorted to analogies with traditional property rights. The
Privy Council originally likened Aboriginal title to a “usufruct”, a form
of property right found in Roman and civil law.1 And more recently,
others have compared Aboriginal title to a “fee simple”  the highest
form of land title known to the common law.2
In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia,3 the Supreme Court of
Canada rightly pours cold water on such efforts. It insists on the
distinctive nature of Aboriginal title as a sui generis right and resists any
attempt to fit it into standard property categories. As Chief Justice
McLachlin explains for a unanimous Court:
Analogies to other forms of property ownership  for example, fee
simple  may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal title. But
they cannot dictate precisely what it is or is not. As La Forest J. put it in
Delgamuukw, at para. 190, Aboriginal title “is not equated with fee
simple ownership; nor can it be described with reference to traditional
property law concepts”.4

*
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am indebted to
Professors Kent McNeil and Dwight Newman, whose comments prompted a number of
clarifications in the argument. I am also grateful for the invaluable research support provided by
Daniel Ciarabellini.
1
In St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46, at 54
[hereinafter “St. Catherine’s”], the Privy Council described Aboriginal title as a “personal and
usufructuary right”. For critical discussion, see William B. Henderson, “Canada’s Indian Reserves:
The Usufruct in Our Constitution” (1980) 12 Ottawa L. Rev. 167.
2
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at
para. 110 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”], the appellants argued that Aboriginal title was
tantamount to an “inalienable fee simple”.
3
[2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”].
4
Id., at para. 72.
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Nevertheless, nature abhors a vacuum. When we have nothing with
which to compare Aboriginal title, traditional property concepts tend to
slip back into the discussion. Indeed, McLachlin C.J.C. immediately goes
on to say:
Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated
with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be
used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to
possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the
right to pro-actively use and manage the land.5

These are significant similarities. Yet, as Tsilhqot’in Nation makes
clear, in many other ways Aboriginal title is strikingly different from fee
simple  so different that one wonders if it can be the same sort of right
at all. Consider these points of distinction. First, Aboriginal title is a
collective right  vested in an Aboriginal People rather than an
individual.6 Moreover, it is inherently collective  it cannot be held by
an individual, but only by a group. By contrast, fee simple is typically
vested in a single individual.
Second, Aboriginal title is internally pluralistic. Although it presents
a uniform face to the outside world, it is governed internally by the laws
of the particular Aboriginal Nation  laws that differ from one Nation to
the next.7 In sum, Aboriginal title has a complex internal structure. It is
like a clockwork egg, its smooth surface concealing an intricate world
within  a world as diverse as its Aboriginal title-holders. By contrast,
fee simple typically lacks such an internal structure, let alone one so
diverse.
Third, Aboriginal title has a jurisdictional dimension. The fact that it
is vested in a community means that there must be some body or bodies
endowed with the authority to determine which individuals have the right
to use the land and to regulate the ways the land may be used.8 By
contrast, the fact that fee simple is generally held by an individual
ordinarily obviates the need for such a power.

5

Id., at para. 73 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 74. I use the terms “Aboriginal Nation” and “Aboriginal People” in a broad,
interchangeable sense, so as to comprise all the Aboriginal Peoples covered by s. 35, Constitution
Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, where they are described as
including “the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada”.
7
Id., at para. 75.
8
Id., at paras. 18, 73, 94.
6
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Fourth, Aboriginal title is inalienable  it cannot be sold or
transferred outside the group, but may only be surrendered to the
Crown.9 Fee simple, on the other hand, is inherently alienable; it may be
sold, leased and bequeathed with very few restrictions.10
Fifth, according to the Supreme Court, Aboriginal title is subject to
an inherent limit which prevents the land from being despoiled or
encumbered in ways that preclude future generations from using and
enjoying the land.11 By contrast, at common law, lands held under fee
simple may be exploited in any manner the owner sees fit  even laid to
waste or rendered unfit for normal purposes.12
Finally, Aboriginal title flows from a special historical relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Chief Justice McLachlin
comments:
It is this relationship that makes Aboriginal title sui generis or unique.
Aboriginal title is what it is — the unique product of the historic
relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group in question. 13

This final characteristic provides the key to the nature of Aboriginal
title. The historical relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples evolved organically from a complex series of treaties, alliances
and associations from the 1600s onward, many of which continue to the
present day. Over time this relationship took on a constitutional
character, as Aboriginal peoples became partners in the emerging
federation of Canada.14 Aboriginal title, as the “unique product” of this
relationship, shares in its constitutional character.
In effect, the reason why Aboriginal title cannot be described in
traditional property terms is that it is not a concept of private law at all. It
is a concept of public law. It does not deal with the rights of private
entities but with the rights and powers of constitutional entities that form
part of the Canadian federation. If we cast about for analogies to
Aboriginal title, we discover a close parallel in Provincial title  the
rights held by the Provinces to lands within their boundaries. Indeed a

9

Id., at para. 74.
This is the position at common law. Of course, restrictions may be imposed by legislation.
11
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 74.
12
Once again, these remarks deal with the position at common law. Legislation normally
poses significant limits to the owner’s rights.
13
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 72.
14
For detailed discussion, see B. Slattery, “The Aboriginal Constitution” in J. Cameron,
B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 319.
10
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comparison between Aboriginal title and Provincial title has the capacity
to shed light on some puzzling aspects of the subject.
This observation may at first seem surprising  it is certainly not
how Aboriginal title has often been viewed. So in the next section we
will sketch in broad strokes the main similarities between the two forms
of title. Nevertheless, Aboriginal title and Provincial title are hardly
identical, and in the third section we will explore some complications
and differences. One such is the “inherent limit” on Aboriginal title,
which has no apparent parallel on the Provincial side. Another arises
from the fact that many Aboriginal title lands are located within
Provincial boundaries, leading to questions about the relative rights of
Aboriginal Nation and Province. A final complication arises from the
joint application of Aboriginal, Provincial and Federal laws to
Aboriginal lands.15

II. THE KINSHIP OF ABORIGINAL TITLE AND PROVINCIAL TITLE
1. Collective
Both Aboriginal title and Provincial title are inherently collective in
character  that is, both are vested in constitutional entities that
represent communities of people. In the first case, the title is lodged in
the Aboriginal Nation under the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title,
as recognized and affirmed in section 35, Constitution Act, 1982.16 In the
other case, the title is held by the Province under sections 109 and 117,
Constitution Act, 1867,17 and related clauses. As we will see later, in both
instances the title is a species of beneficial interest; neither the
Aboriginal Nation nor the Province holds the ultimate title to the land,
which is vested in the unitary Crown.18
The collective character of Aboriginal title has been established in a
long series of cases. Thus in Delgamuukw,19 Lamer C.J.C. holds that
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual Aboriginal persons; it is a
collective right vested in all members of an Aboriginal Nation.20
15
For the sake of brevity, Aboriginal title lands are henceforth described simply as
“Aboriginal lands”.
16
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
17
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5].
18
See discussion below in s. II.3.
19
Delgamuukw, supra, note 2.
20
Id., at para. 115.
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Tsilhqot’in Nation reiterates this view, but with a slightly different
emphasis:
Aboriginal title, however, comes with an important restriction — it is
collective title held not only for the present generation but for all
succeeding generations.21

As for the Provinces, their collective title to the public lands within
their borders is recognized in section 109, Constitution Act, 1867, which
provides:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several
Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union …
shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject to
any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that
of the Province in the same.22

With both Provinces and Aboriginal Nations, the collective nature of
their title is a function of their public character as constitutional entities
representing communities of people. However, as we will see later, this
collective character does not preclude a Province or Aboriginal Nation
from allocating or recognizing individual rights to the lands in question
 in each case to the extent permitted by the laws of the Province or
Nation and subject to overall constitutional limits.
One difference may be noted here: while Provincial title traces its
origins to the Crown, Aboriginal title is a form of allodial title  one
that does not originate in the Crown but rests on the common law
doctrine of Aboriginal title, which is a form of inter-societal law linking
Aboriginal Peoples with the Crown.23

Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 74; see also para. 86.
See also s. 117, Constitution Act, 1867, which provides: “The several Provinces
shall retain all their respective Public Property not otherwise disposed of in this Act …”.
Section 109 refers only to the original Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Sc otia and
New Brunswick, however the Provinces that subsequently joined Confederation were
eventually placed in a similar position. For detailed discussion, see: Gerard La Forest, Natural
Resources and Public Property under the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1969), at 1-47 [hereinafter “La Forest, Natural Resources”]; and Peter Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007,
updated), ch. 29 [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”].
23
For discussion and references, see Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal
Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255, at 257-59, 269-71 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Metamorphosis of
Aboriginal Title’”].
21
22
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2. Pluralist
Both Provincial title and Aboriginal title shelter under their auspices
a diverse array of land regimes. In each case the title is basically uniform
in external structure but diverse in internal make-up  like a chemical
compound that assumes a myriad of crystalline forms. Thus, although
Quebec holds a title that in its exterior dimensions is virtually identical to
that of Ontario, its internal land regime is quite distinctive, governed by
civil law rather than common law. By the same token, while the
Aboriginal title of the Mi’kmaq is basically the same in external make-up
as the title of the Tsilhqot’in, in each case it assumes a different inner
form, as determined by the laws of the Nation.24
The diversity of Provincial land regimes flows from section 129 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, which continues in force the laws that applied in
the various Provinces before they joined Confederation.25 In the case of
Quebec, this law was the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866, which
codified the melange of old French law and legislation that hitherto
governed property and civil rights in the Province. In the rest of Canada,
the land regime was based on English common law, with an overlay of
statutes.26
On the Aboriginal side, the multiplicity of land regimes stems from the
common law principle of continuity, whereby the laws and customs of
Aboriginal Nations presumptively continued in force after the advent of
the Crown.27 As McLachlin C.J.C. states in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case:
Aboriginal title post-sovereignty reflects the fact of Aboriginal
occupancy pre-sovereignty, with all the pre-sovereignty incidents of
24
For discussion, see Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can.
Bar Rev. 727, at 744-48 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights’”]; Slattery,
“Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title”, supra, note 23, at 269-71, 279; Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal
Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2014) 91 Can. Bar Rev. 745 [hereinafter “McNeil,
‘Aboriginal Title in Canada’”].
25
Section 129 states: “Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all Laws in force in
Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick at the Union … shall continue in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick respectively , as if the Union had not been made; …”.
26
See the historical review in Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed. (Toronto:
Thomson Reuters, 2014), at 61-75.
27
For discussion, see: Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra, note 24, at 738-39;
Peter Hutchins, Carol Hilling & David Schulze, “The Aboriginal Right to Self-Government and the
Canadian Constitution: The Ghost in the Machine” (1995) 29 U.B.C. Law Rev. 251, especially at
262-64 [hereinafter, “Hutchins, Hilling & Schulze, ‘Aboriginal Right to Self-Government’”]; Mark
D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under
the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711; McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada”,
supra, note 24.
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use and enjoyment that were part of the collective title enjoyed by the
ancestors of the claimant group — most notably the right to control
how the land is used. However, these uses are not confined to the uses
and customs of pre-sovereignty times; like other land-owners,
Aboriginal title holders of modern times can use their land in modern
ways, if that is their choice. 28

In other words, an Aboriginal Nation inherits the body of traditional
laws and customs governing the use of its lands, subject always to the
Nation’s right to adapt and supplement these laws so as to meet
contemporary needs and conditions.29
3. Beneficial
Both Provincial title and Aboriginal title are forms of beneficial title,
which import the right to use and control the land and to enjoy its
benefits. The ultimate title to both Provincial lands and Aboriginal lands
is vested in the unitary Crown  not the Crown in right of the Province
or the Crown in right of the Dominion, but the Crown considered as an
indivisible entity. In neither case does the Crown’s ultimate title carry
any beneficial rights to the land.
As regards the Province, this general schema was first elaborated nearly
a century and a half ago in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v.
The Queen.30 The Privy Council held that, wherever public land is described
in constitutional instruments as “the property of” or as “belonging to” a
Province, these expressions simply mean that the right to its beneficial use or
proceeds has been appropriated to the Province and is subject to the control
of its legislature, the land itself being vested in the Crown.31 In other words,
all beneficial interest in public lands within provincial boundaries lies with
the Province, while the title remains in the Crown.32
28
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 75. See also R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J.
No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J., at para. 263: “The history of the interface of
Europeans and the common law with aboriginal peoples is a long one. As might be expected of such
a long history, the principles by which the interface has been governed have not always been
consistently applied. Yet running through this history, from its earliest beginnings to the present time
is a golden thread  the recognition by the common law of the ancestral laws and customs of the
aboriginal peoples who occupied the land prior to European settlement.”
29
See generally John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010).
30
(1888), 14 A.C. 46 [hereinafter “St. Catherine’s”]. For discussion and further references,
see La Forest, Natural Resources, supra, note 22, at 15-26.
31
St. Catherine’s, supra, note 30, at 56 (para. 8).
32
Id., at 55 (para. 7).
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The Supreme Court confirms this holding in the recent case of
Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources),33 which
concerns a transfer of territories from the Dominion of Canada to the
Province of Ontario effected in the Ontario Boundaries Extension Act.34
Chief Justice McLachlin holds for the Court that the legislation did not
constitute a transfer of Crown rights in the lands to Ontario, but rather a
transfer of the beneficial interest. In effect, it changed the beneficial
owner of the lands and the emanation of the Crown responsible for
dealing with them, but it did not alter the position of the unitary Crown
as holder of the ultimate title.35
The Tsilhqot’in Nation case adopts a similar approach to Aboriginal
lands.36 Chief Justice McLachlin holds that Aboriginal title is a beneficial
interest in the land, the ultimate title to which is vested in the Crown.
This means that the Aboriginal title-holders have the right to the benefits
associated with the land  the right to use it, enjoy it and profit from its
economic development. For its part, the Crown does not hold any
beneficial interest in the land. It does not have the right to use and enjoy
the land or benefit from any profits flowing from its use. It holds only the
radical or underlying title, which has two related components, namely a
fiduciary duty owed to Aboriginal people when dealing with their land,
and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if this can be justified under
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.37 These components apply at
both Provincial and Federal levels, depending on which emanation of the
Crown has the constitutional authority to deal with the Aboriginal lands
in question.
4. Jurisdictional
Provinces and Aboriginal Nations alike have the power to manage
their lands and to pass laws governing their management.38 This power
[2014] S.C.J. No. 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grassy Narrows”].
S.C. 1912, c. 40.
35
Grassy Narrows, supra, note 33, at paras. 46, 48.
36
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at paras. 18, 69-71.
37
Id., at para. 71.
38
For parallel approaches that stress the jurisdictional dimensions of Aboriginal title, see
Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty” (1998)
5 Tulsa J. of Comp. and Int’l L. 253, reprinted in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on
Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 2001), 58 at 95-101; Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights and Self-Government:
Inseparable Entitlements” in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds., Between Indigenous and Settler
33
34
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has both executive and legislative aspects. It includes the power to grant
land rights to private individuals and groups by way of sale, lease and
licence, to the extent permitted by the laws of the particular Province or
Aboriginal Nation. It also comprises the power to pass laws and
regulations controlling how the lands are allocated and used, so as to
ensure that the public interest is served  including the power to
expropriate private property and other interests in land. The Supreme
Court has further suggested that Aboriginal Nations are subject to an
“inherent limit” in the form of a constitutional duty to safeguard the
rights of future generations  to be discussed later.39
In the case of the Provinces, this power is established by section 92(5)
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides that the Provincial
legislature has the exclusive power to make laws regarding the
“Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province
and of the Timber and Wood thereon.” This provision is complemented
by section 92(13), which confers the power to legislate for “Property and
Civil Rights in the Province”.40
Aboriginal Peoples stand in broadly the same position with respect to
Aboriginal title lands, under section 35, Constitution Act, 1982. In the
Tsilhqot’in Nation case, the Supreme Court affirms that an Aboriginal
Nation has the right “to use and control the land and enjoy its benefits”.41
As noted earlier, this includes “the right to decide how the land will be
used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to
possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the
right to pro-actively use and manage the land”.42 In sum, Aboriginal title
confers:
... the right to determine, subject to the inherent limits of group title
held for future generations, the uses to which the land is put and to
enjoy its economic fruits. As we have seen, this is not merely a right of

Governance (Routledge, 2013), 135-47; Dwight Newman, “Aboriginal ‘Rights’ as Powers: Section 35
and Federalism Theory” in Graeme Mitchell et al., eds., A Living Tree: The Legacy of 1982 in
Canada’s Political Evolution (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2007), 527-40. For general discussions
of Aboriginal governmental powers, see: Hutchins, Hilling & Schulze, “Aboriginal Right to SelfGovernment”, supra, note 27; Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of
Trust” (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261, at 278-87.
39
See s. III.1, below.
40
For detailed discussion, see La Forest, Natural Resources, supra, note 22, at 164-76;
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 22, ch. 29.
41
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 18.
42
Id., at para. 73.
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first refusal with respect to Crown land management or usage plans.
Rather, it is the right to proactively use and manage the land.43

This means that some authoritative body or bodies within the Nation
must be vested with the power to ascertain and allocate rights to the land
and to control its use and preservation, including the power to
expropriate individual interests. While the existence and scope of this
jurisdiction are determined globally by the common law of Aboriginal
rights, the legal machinery and modalities through which it is exercised
are governed by the particular constitution and laws of the Nation in
question.44
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the power of an Aboriginal
Nation to grant land rights to private individuals and entities is restricted
by two elements: (1) the rule against alienation; and (2) the “inherent
limit”. We will consider the first topic in the next section, and take up the
question of the “inherent limit” later.45
5. Inalienable
In the case of both Provinces and Aboriginal Nations, there are strict
restrictions on the power to alienate their lands in such a way as to
amputate the lands from the communal territory  in effect, altering the
territorial boundaries of the Province or the Nation.
Thus the Province of Ontario cannot by simple agreement transfer its
lands to another Province (much less to a private entity) in such a way as
to sever those lands from the territory of Ontario. To do this requires a
constitutional amendment under Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Section 43 provides that that any alteration to boundaries between
Provinces may only be made when authorized by resolutions of the
Senate and House of Commons of Canada and of the legislative
assembly of each Province to which the amendment applies. More
generally, under sections 38(1) and 38(2) a constitutional amendment
that derogates from the proprietary rights of a Province requires
resolutions supported by a majority of the members of the Senate, the
House of Commons and the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds
43
Id., at para. 94. See also Delgamuukw, supra, note 2, at para. 115 (emphasis added),
where Lamer C.J.C. observes: “Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is
a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that
land are also made by that community.”
44
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 75.
45
See s. III.1, below.
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of the Provinces that have at least 50 per cent of the population of all the
Provinces.46
These requirements do not, of course, affect the Province’s capacity
to grant or sell lands to private parties, so long as the lands continue to be
part of the Province and remain subject to its laws and jurisdiction. What
the Province cannot do (not at least without a constitutional amendment)
is to transfer its lands in a manner that purports to free them from that
jurisdiction.
Similarly an Aboriginal Nation cannot alienate its lands to another entity
(whether Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal) in such a way as to permanently
sever the lands from the Nation’s territory  not at least without following
special constitutional procedures involving a surrender to the Crown.47 This
rule traces its origins to laws passed in British American colonies during the
17th and 18th centuries,48 and it was subsequently given general application
in the Royal Proclamation, 1763.49 In the latter document, the King refers to
the great frauds and abuses committed in purchasing Indian lands and goes
on to forbid private persons from making such purchases:
... but that if, at any Time, any of the Said Indians should be inclined to
dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in
Our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to
be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our
Colony respectively within which they shall lie …

This rule aimed to quash the practice whereby settlers and speculators
purchased lands from Aboriginal Nations and then claimed title to those
lands under the legal systems applying within the settler communities. In
effect, this practise purported to convert titles held under Aboriginal law
and custom to ones held under English law. Not only were such purchases
often tainted with fraud, they also ran afoul of the common law rule that
generally speaking all titles to land should originate in the Crown. As
Lamer C.J.C. observes in the Delgamuukw case:
... the inalienability of aboriginal lands is, at least in part, a function of
the common law principle that settlers in colonies must derive their title
46
See also s. 38(3) which permits a Province to block the application of such an amendment
to the Province by passing a dissenting resolution in its legislative assembly.
47
For discussion, see Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra, note 24, at 742-43.
48
See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Doctoral Dissertation,
Oxford University, 1979), at 112-17, online: <http://works.bepress.com/brian_slattery/24>.
49
Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter “Royal Proclamation”]. A more
accurate text of the Proclamation is found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations
Relating to America (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), at 212.
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from Crown grant and, therefore, cannot acquire title through purchase
from aboriginal inhabitants. It is also, again only in part, a function of a
general policy ‘to ensure that Indians are not dispossessed of their
entitlements’: see Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85,
at p. 133.50

However, the rule against alienation does not affect the Aboriginal
Nation’s capacity to grant or lease lands under its own laws, so long as
the lands remain part of the communal territory and subject to the
Nation’s jurisdiction. This point was recognized almost two centuries ago
by the United States Supreme Court in the classic case of Johnson &
Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh.51 The plaintiffs laid claim to certain lands
in the state of Illinois, relying on conveyances made to private
individuals in the 1770s by the chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw
Nations. The same Nations subsequently ceded the lands in question
under public treaty to the government of the United States, which in turn
granted them to the defendant. The issue was whether the plaintiffs’ title,
ostensibly acquired directly from the Aboriginal Nations, prevailed over
the defendant’s title, which stemmed from the American government.
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, rejects the
plaintiffs’ claim to hold title under the Indian purchases. He cites several
grounds.52 The first and most familiar maintains that, under the law and
practice of Great Britain and the United States, the state possesses the
exclusive power to dispose of lands in the American colonies and to
extinguish Indian title by purchase or conquest. The Court cites the socalled “principle of discovery” as well as the prohibition of private
purchases in the Royal Proclamation, 1763.
However, Marshall C.J.C. also advances a distinct line of reasoning,
which is highly relevant here. He points out that the title of the Crown
can be acquired only by a conveyance from the Crown. If a private
individual purchases Indian title for his own benefit, he can acquire only
that title. Assuming that the Indians have the power under their laws or
customs to allow an individual to hold a portion of their lands in
severalty, still the land remains part of the Indians’ territory and
continues to be held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The
grant derives its efficacy from their will, and if they choose to retake the
50
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land and make a different disposition of it (as by surrendering the land to
the Crown), the courts of the United States cannot intervene to protect
the title.
The person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property
purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their
laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise
and set aside the proceeding. We know of no principle which can
distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian, authorizing
him to hold a particular tract of land in severalty.53

In effect, the Court draws a distinction between internal land grants,
which remain subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the Aboriginal
Nation, and external transfers, which purport to remove the land from the
Aboriginal territory. The rule against the alienation of Aboriginal lands
forbids the second sort of disposition, not the first.
Nevertheless, some cases appear to state the rule against alienation
more broadly. For example, in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. says:
Lands held pursuant to aboriginal title cannot be transferred, sold or
surrendered to anyone other than the Crown and, as a result, is
inalienable to third parties.54

Taken in its broadest sense, such language might rule out any
transfers or sales of Aboriginal lands, even ones that do not affect the
lands’ status as part of the Aboriginal territory. However, the better view
is that it refers only to external transactions, not internal ones. The key
question is whether the Aboriginal Nation retains jurisdiction over the
lands and hence the power to control their use and to retake them when
necessary. If so, the transaction does not violate the rule against
alienation.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that, at the least, the rule forbids
dispositions of Aboriginal land to persons who are not members of the
Aboriginal Nation. Such transactions, it is said, run afoul of the objective
of protecting Aboriginal lands from exploitation by outsiders. However,
the argument does not seem convincing. Of course, the internal laws and
customs of an Aboriginal Nation may restrict or forbid grants of land
rights to outsiders, so long as basic constitutional norms are observed. But
there does not seem to be anything in the rule against alienation proper that
53
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prevents such transactions so long as the Aboriginal Nation retains control
of the lands and the power to take them back if and when needed.

III. COMPLICATIONS
1. The Inherent Limit
According to the Supreme Court, an Aboriginal Nation’s ability to
use and manage its lands is restricted by an “inherent limit” — for which
no parallel exists on the Provincial side. The concept first surfaces in the
Delgamuukw case, where Lamer C.J.C. states that lands held pursuant to
Aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the
nature of the attachment to the land that forms the basis of the Aboriginal
group’s claim to title.55 The Chief Justice makes it clear that this
limitation does not confine an Aboriginal group to traditional or
customary uses of their lands.56 That, he says, would be to impose a
“legal straightjacket”.57 To the contrary, Aboriginal lands may be used for
a broad variety of contemporary purposes, regardless whether or not
those uses are grounded in the original practices, customs and traditions
of the group. Such uses, for example, may extend to the exploitation of
any minerals on the lands, including oil and gas reserves.58
What then does the inherent limit rule out? In effect, says the Chief
Justice, it prevents an Aboriginal group from using its lands in such a
way as to rupture the bond with the land that forms the historical basis of
the group’s title. For example, if the group’s occupancy has been
established by the use of the land as a hunting ground, then the group
may not use it in a way that destroys its value for such a purpose, as by
strip-mining it. Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land
because of its ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not devote the
land to uses which destroy that relationship, as by turning it into a
parking lot.59 Chief Justice Lamer draws an analogy with the doctrine of
equitable waste at common law, which states that persons holding a life
estate in real property cannot commit “wanton or extravagant acts of
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destruction” or “ruin the property”.60 Those descriptions, he says, capture
the kind of limit he has in mind.
It may be seen that two different versions of the inherent limit run
through this account. The first is an historical approach which seeks
to safeguard the original relationship that an Aboriginal group held
with its ancestral lands. The second is a stewardship approach which
bars activities that effectively destroy the land or render it unfit for
future use. The two approaches are not wholly consistent and may
yield differing results. For example, where an Aboriginal Nation
historically used a tract of land for hunting and gathering, converting
the entire tract to mixed farming and ranching would arguably rupture
the group’s historical relationship with the land because it rules out a
hunting and gathering lifestyle. By contrast, on the stewardship
approach, the activities of farming and ranching would not ordinarily
be considered “wanton or extravagant acts of destruction” that “ruin
the property”. Indeed, it can be argued that the historical approach
risks imposing just the kind of legal straight-jacket that the Chief
Justice hopes to avoid, whereas the stewardship approach is more
flexible and forward-looking.
Chief Justice Lamer does not cite any precedents supporting either
version of the inherent limit  not surprisingly, because none seem to
exist. No trace of the concept can be found in prior leading cases on
Aboriginal rights, nor does it feature in such major historical documents
as the Royal Proclamation, 1763 or the Treaties with Aboriginal peoples.
Indeed, the contrary view is expressed in a famous passage from Johnson
v. M’Intosh, where Marshall C.J.C. states that Aboriginal Peoples “were
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion …”.61 This passage has been quoted in innumerable Canadian
cases,62 and it supports the conclusion that Aboriginal people have the
right to use their lands as they see fit, subject only to the rule against
external alienation.
60
Id., at para. 130. Chief Justice Lamer derives these phrases from E.H. Burn,
Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property, 14th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1988), at
264, and Robert E. Megarry and H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property, 4th ed. (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1975), at 105.
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So Lamer C.J.C. appears to have created the inherent limit out of
whole cloth. Of course the common law is no stranger to judicial
innovation, and there is little reason to think the law of Aboriginal title is
immune to evolution and change.63 Nevertheless, the novelty of the
concept turns the spotlight on the reasons advanced to support it. How
adequate are they?
The Chief Justice’s principal argument is that, since the purpose of
Aboriginal title is to protect historical Aboriginal occupancy, that
purpose should continue into the future and rule out activities that
jeopardize the ability of future generations to use and enjoy the lands.
“Implicit in the protection of historic patterns of occupation is a
recognition of the importance of the continuity of the relationship of an
aboriginal community to its land over time.”64 In effect, this protection
applies not only to the past but also to the future. As a result, concludes
the Chief Justice, “uses of the lands that would threaten that future
relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of
aboriginal title.”65
However the conclusion does not appear to follow from the
premises. No doubt the doctrine of Aboriginal title is intended to protect
ancestral lands from the threat of depredation. However, as the
provisions of the Royal Proclamation, 1763 make crystal clear, such
threats have stemmed from external sources, in the form of invasive
governmental land grants, illicit settlement and fraudulent purchases. The
doctrine of Aboriginal title has traditionally sought to place a protective
hedge around ancestral lands, not to restrict what kind of Aboriginal
activities go on within that hedge. In arguing (correctly) that this
protection continues into the future, the Chief Justice makes an
unwarranted leap from external protection to internal limitation. To put
the matter another way, the mere fact that a doctrine is intended to
protect historical occupation does not warrant the conclusion that it
carries an inherent limit. Were that the case, a similar limit would govern
all land-holdings in Quebec that were protected and continued upon the
advent of the British Crown in 1763.
Chief Justice Lamer also argues that the inherent limit has an affinity
with the rule forbidding alienation of Aboriginal lands, since alienation
would bring to an end the Aboriginal group’s entitlement and terminate
63
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its relationship with the land. In effect, he says, Aboriginal land is more
than just a fungible commodity. It has an “inherent and unique value” to
its title-holders, which is not exhausted by its economic value. Hence the
Aboriginal Nation cannot put the land to uses which would destroy that
value.66 Nevertheless, says the Chief Justice, the unique value of
Aboriginal lands does not detract from the ability of an Aboriginal
People to surrender its lands to the Crown in exchange for valuable
consideration. To the contrary, he says, the idea of surrender reinforces
the conclusion that Aboriginal title is subject to an inherent limit: “If
aboriginal peoples wish to use their lands in a way that aboriginal title
does not permit, then they must surrender those lands and convert them
into non-title lands to do so.”67
The logic of this argument is somewhat puzzling. The objective of
preserving Aboriginal lands for future generations seems more likely to
be subverted by the possibility of surrender to the Crown, than the
contrary. To repeat, the main dangers to Aboriginal lands have
historically stemmed from external sources. The underlying rationale of
the rule against alienation would more plausibly support tighter
restrictions on surrenders to the Crown than limitations on internal
activities.
Overall, then, the arguments in favour of the inherent limit seem far
from convincing. Nevertheless, the concept makes a return appearance in
the Tsilhqot’in Nation case, albeit in a modified form. Chief Justice
McLachlin quotes Delgamuukw to the effect that an Aboriginal group’s
uses of its land must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s
attachment to that land, explaining that “it is group title and cannot be
alienated in a way that deprives future generations of the control and
benefit of the land”.68 She elaborates on these points in a passage that
merits full quotation:
Aboriginal title … comes with an important restriction  it is
collective title held not only for the present generation but for all
succeeding generations. This means it cannot be alienated except to the
Crown or encumbered in ways that would prevent future generations of
the group from using and enjoying it. Nor can the land be developed or
misused in a way that would substantially deprive future generations of
the benefit of the land. Some changes  even permanent changes — to
66
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the land may be possible. Whether a particular use is irreconcilable
with the ability of succeeding generations to benefit from the land will
be a matter to be determined when the issue arises. 69

This passage represents a shift away from the historical approach,
which links the inherent limit to the particular relationship an Aboriginal
group originally held with its lands, to the stewardship approach, which
highlights the need to preserve the overall value of the land, preventing
activities that “destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations
of Aboriginal peoples”.70
What are the merits of this revised version of the inherent limit? On
the one hand, it has the unexceptionable goal of seeking to ensure that
the ancestral territory of an Aboriginal Nation retains its worth for the
indefinite future  making it more difficult for any single generation to
favour its own short-term interests over those of future generations. The
concept also has a certain resonance with the philosophical beliefs of
many Aboriginal Peoples  that they are mere “stewards” of the land,
which they hold in trust for generations to come. To this extent, the
concept stands in contrast to the individualistic philosophy that animates
some aspects of the common law, which allows land-owners to
effectively destroy their lands with impunity.
On the other hand, however, one would have thought that these
matters should be left in the hands of Aboriginal Peoples themselves,
who are best able to judge how to manage their lands in accordance with
their own laws and traditions. Once again a comparison with Provincial
title proves helpful. As seen earlier, both the Province and the Aboriginal
Nation hold collective titles to their lands, and both are subject to
constitutional restraints on external alienation. The fact that Provincial
title is inherently collective and held for the benefit of present and future
generations has never been thought to import an inherent limit that
restricts the Province’s ability to make decisions about managing its
lands or that subjects those decisions to judicial scrutiny.
In the end, however, the greatest problem with the inherent limit is
the uncertainty that it breeds, inevitably fostering conflict and litigation
and discouraging beneficial development. As the Supreme Court
acknowledges, there is considerable doubt as to what sorts of activities
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the inherent limit actually rules out.71 The unfortunate result is that
Aboriginal Nations may be prompted to surrender their lands to the
Crown in order to convert their rights into European-style titles, thus
avoiding the ambiguities of the inherent limit and the costs and delays
associated with litigation. This is surely not the result the Supreme Court
intended.
2. The Interaction of Provincial and Aboriginal Titles
When Aboriginal lands are located within the boundaries of a
Province, what legal interest does the Province have in such lands? The
basic framework for an answer is provided by section 109 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, which states that all lands belonging to the
Provinces at the time of Confederation shall continue to belong to them
“subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest
other than that of the Province in the same”.72 In the St. Catherine’s case,
the Privy Council holds that Indian title is an “Interest other than that of
the Province” which constitutes a burden on the underlying title of the
Crown. When Indian title is surrendered to the Crown, the beneficial
interest in the lands passes to the Province, with the ultimate title
remaining in the Crown.73
However, absent such a surrender, what sort of interest does the
Province possess in Aboriginal lands? It is not a form of beneficial
interest because the full beneficial title is vested in the Aboriginal
Nation. Neither does it constitute the underlying title, because that title is
held by the Crown  an entity distinct from both the Province and the
Dominion. Thus the Province holds at best some form of conditional
future interest in Aboriginal lands  a sui generis interest that does not
import any current rights of possession or enjoyment, and which may
never come to fruition. This interpretation appears to accord with the
account offered in Tsilhqot’in Nation:
Aboriginal title confers a right to the land itself and the Crown is
obligated to justify any incursions on title. As explained above, the
content of the Crown’s underlying title is limited to the fiduciary duty
71
Id., at para. 74: “Whether a particular use is irreconcilable with the ability of succeeding
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owed and the right to encroach subject to justification. It would be hard
to say that the Crown is presently entitled to enjoyment of the lands in
the way property that is vested in possession would be. Similarly,
although Aboriginal title can be alienated to the Crown, this does not
confer a fixed right to future enjoyment in the way property that is
vested in interest would. Rather, it would seem that Aboriginal title
vests the lands in question in the Aboriginal group.74

This does not mean that the Province lacks the power to pass laws of
general application extending to Aboriginal lands. As the Privy Council
holds in the Fisheries Case,75 proprietary rights and legislative
jurisdiction are distinct matters. Thus, for example, the fact that the
federal Parliament has jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter such as
“Fisheries” does not mean that it possesses any proprietary rights with
respect to it. Conversely, as we will now see, the fact the Province does
not have a present proprietary interest in Aboriginal lands does not mean
that it altogether lacks legislative jurisdiction.
3. The Division of Powers
How then does the existence of Aboriginal title affect the powers of
Parliament and the Provincial legislatures to pass laws applying to the
lands in question? This question merits a paper in its own right. Our
remarks here are limited to three general propositions.
First, just as a Provincial legislature has primary jurisdiction to
manage its lands under sections 92(5) and 92(13) of the Constitution Act,
1867, so also an Aboriginal Nation has primary powers of management
over its lands under the doctrine of Aboriginal title and section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
Second, just as Provincial lands may be affected in certain respects
by legislation passed by the Federal Parliament, so also Aboriginal lands
may be affected in certain respects by statutes passed at both Provincial
and Federal levels.
Third, just as there are significant limits on Federal powers to affect
Provincial lands and powers of management (embodied in sections 91-92A
and 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867), so also there are strict
constitutional restraints on both Provincial and Federal powers to affect
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 112 (emphasis added).
Re British North America Act, 1867, s. 108 (Can.), [1898] A.C. 700 [the “Fisheries
Case”], at para. 4. For discussion, see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 22, ch. 29.4.
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Aboriginal lands and management powers (flowing from section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, as well as sections 91(24) and 109 of the
Constitution Act, 1867).
We have already considered the Aboriginal power to manage its
lands under the doctrine of Aboriginal title.76 We turn to the second and
third propositions, upon which Tsilhqot’in Nation throws a partial light,
relating mainly to the Provinces.77 Chief Justice McLachlin holds that,
broadly speaking, Provincial laws of general application apply to lands
held under Aboriginal title. The reason is that, in general, Provincial
governments have the power to regulate land use within the Province,
regardless whether the lands are held by the Crown, by private owners,
or by the holders of Aboriginal title. This power is grounded in
section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which gives the Provinces
the power to legislate with respect to property and civil rights in the
Province.
Nevertheless, observes the Chief Justice, Provincial power to regulate
land held under Aboriginal title is constitutionally curbed in two distinct
ways. First, it is limited by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which
requires any abridgment of the rights flowing from Aboriginal title to have
a compelling and substantial governmental objective and to be consistent
with the Crown’s fiduciary relationship with the Aboriginal title holders.
Second, in some instances a Province’s power may also be limited by the
Federal power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” under
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The point to be drawn from this brief discussion is that the
constitutional restrictions on Federal and Provincial powers regarding
Aboriginal lands are more akin to the limits enshrined in the division of
powers between the Federal government and the Provinces, than they are
to the protections afforded to individual rights in the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.78 The fact that Aboriginal title has important
constitutional and jurisdictional dimensions introduces a number of
factors that are largely absent in the Charter context. The complexity of
the case law governing the division of powers between Federal and
Provincial authorities indicates how much work remains to be done in
determining the relative scope of Aboriginal, Federal and Provincial
powers  and stands as a warning against easy generalizations.
76
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IV. CONCLUSION
Aboriginal title is a close cousin of Provincial title. It has a similar
underlying structure and rationale, designed to preserve for the group the
power to manage and benefit from its lands, without undue interference
from other levels of authority. Aboriginal title finds its initial
constitutional expression in the Royal Proclamation, 1763, just as
Provincial title is recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867. Like
Provincial title, Aboriginal title is a collective right that carries with it
extensive jurisdictional powers and is protected by constitutional rules
against external alienation. In the case of both Aboriginal Nations and the
Provinces, the beneficial title to their lands is vested in the community,
while the underlying title is held by the Crown. Just as one may speak of
the Crown in right of the Province, perhaps one may also speak of the
Crown in the right of the Aboriginal Nation.

